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whether the term, any party, is broad enough to allow a defendant
to use his prior deposition to contradict his present testimony, i.e.,
can a prior deposition be used as evidence in chief.
In Mravlja v. Hoke,20O the court held that it was error to
permit the defendant to contradict his own testimony by his prior
deposition. However, since the defendant had corrected his testimony to conform to the deposition the error was not prejudicial.
Thus the term, any party, was held not broad enough to allow
a party to contradict his own testimony by his deposition.
Under the CPA, prior contradictory statements did not constitute affirmative evidence; they were not admissible as evidence
in chief. 201 The sole ground upon which such deposition was
admissible was to impeach the testimony of the deponent. This
philosophy has been incorporated into CPLR 3117(a) (1).202 Thus
a party cannot, under the CPLR, use a deposition to "impeach"
himself.
CPLR 3120: Examination before trial held prerequisite to
obtaining discovery.
Under CPA § 324, where discovery could only be had upon
a court order, 08 it was generally held that an examination before
trial was a prerequisite to discovery. 20 ' Then, if the inspection
permitted during the examination was inadequate, discovery would
be allowed.
In disallowing discovery, the court in Ossandon v. New York
City Transit Authority,20 5 cited Battaglia v. New York City Transit
Authority,2 8 a case decided under the CPA. "[I]t was not proper
to direct a discovery and inspection . . . before the conclusion
of the examination before trial. .... ,, 20 The court thus adhered
to the doctrine established under the CPA.
The CPLR has changed the law. Discovery may now be
had without motion, on notice alone. CPLR 3120 requires, however, that the objects of discovery be "specified with reasonable
particularity in the notice. .... ,, 208
When the party seeking discovery under CPLR 3120 has
not sufficient information to particularly specify the object of dis200 22 App. Div. 2d 848, 254 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't 1964).
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closure such information may be obtained by a bill of particulars,
or other article 31 procedure. After the information, is obtained
a notice under CPLR 3120 would be proper. However, since a
motion is no longer required, and the only prerequisite is particularity, where the party can sufficiently identify the object, an
examination before trial would not appear to be a condition
precedent to discovery under 3120.209 In the final analysis the
determination as to whether the notice is sufficiently particular
must lie within the discretion of the court.
CPLR 3120(1): Discovery limited to parties.
The question in Avila Fabrics, Inc. v. 152 West 36th St.
Corp.2 10 was whether CPLR 3120(1) permits discovery of a
document in the exclusive possession of one not a party to the
litigation. Under the CPA, discovery and inspection were limited
to parties. 21 ' The majority commented that the Revisers based
CPLR 3120 on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 which is
specifically limited to parties. The court then held that since
the legislative history of CPLR 3120 shows no intention of
changing the doctrine of the CPA, discovery may not be had against
non-parties. In an excellent dissenting opinion, Justice Eager
pointed out that in view of the liberal policy enunciated in CPLR
3101(a) the discovery provisions in CPLR 3120 should not be
limited to parties.
CPLR 3101(a) provides: "There shall be full disclosure of
all evidence. . . ." Consequently the four subdivisions of CPLR
3101(a) are not restricted to parties. In addition, the disclosure
devices enumerated in CPLR 3102(a) include not only depositions,
but also "discovery and inspection of documents." 2 12 It would,
therefore, appear that discovery, as one form of disclosure under
3101(a) and 3102(a), is not limited to a party to the action.
On the other hand, CPLR 3120 pertaining to discovery provides:
"After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any
other party notice. . . ." Thus an obvious ambiguity exists.
CPLR 3120 in relation to discovery refers to a party to the
action, while CPLR 3101(a) and 3102(a) lead to the conclusion
that discovery, a disclosure device, is not restricted to parties.
209 This position is strengthened by the FrsT REP. 121:

"Parties are not limited in their choice to one or more disclosure devices.
Nor is there any express limit on the number of times a device may be

used.

However, abuse either willful or due to incompetence, may be

checked by [CPLR 3103] . . . !"
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